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Abstract 
This Essay explores the history of formulations of agency doctrine, arguing that agency law can 
best be rationalized as a distinctive subject by recognizing that an agent acts as an extension of 
the principal. The Essay relies on historical material related to the drafting of the Restatements 
of Agency, the disagreements among Reporters and other participants about the contours 
agency law, and the intellectual backdrop against which these experts worked. Their disputes, 
preceded as they were by challenges to the fundamental coherence of agency law, led to 
successive formulations of agency doctrine; while attempting to provide a comprehensive level of 
generality, some formulations threatened to distort established limits on the scope of a 
principal's responsibility for the actions of an agent. 
To explain that distortion, this Essay proceeds first by outlining the debates over the status of 
agency law as an independent branch of law and the ALl's struggles to define agency law. It 
then delves into the history and development of inherent agency power as a doctrine, through its 
inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Agency and culminating in the doctrine's rejection by 
the Restatement (Third). The doctrine of inherent agency power originated as a sort of catch-all 
(termed a "third bottle") for cases in which an agent had neither actual nor apparent authority, 
but nonetheless was able to subject the principal to liability to third parties. Inherent agency 
power generalized these as situations arising from the agency relationship itself and where the 
protection of third parties from harm was sought. As a distinct doctrine, inherent agency power 
risked situations in which a principal would be subject to liability on a transaction entered into 
by an agent when a third party had notice that the agent lacked authority. 
This Essay then explains the impact of inherent agency power doctrine on agency law. The 
perceived necessity for inherent agency power stemmed part from definitions of apparent 
authority that were unduly narrow. Tying the themes of the discussion together, the 
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returns to the distinctiveness of agency doctrine among common-law subjects, a distinctiveness 
that does not require the use of generalizations that lack clarity and normative content. 
1. Introduction 
Agency law is distinctive if not unique among cornmon-law subjects because wide-
ranging consequences follow from definitions and doctrinal formulations that, at first glance, 
look straightforward. Amplifying these consequences, many formally distinct elements of 
agency doctrine are reticulated or interconnected. Additionally, the role or position ascribed to 
agency relative to other bodies of law matters. This Essay explores perennial difficulties in 
formulating agency doctrine within a framework of broader claims about the defining 
characteristics of agency relationships. I wrote this Essay in the spirit of an homage to Larry 
Ribstein's scholarship on fiduciary duty, not that I claim Larry would or would not have agreed 
with me. Indeed reading Larry's scholarship may have been so invigorating for me precisely 
because I often disagreed with it! But Larry always made me think and reconsider my own 
assumptions. Larry made bold claims, insisted on the importance of careful theoretical 
grounding, and anticipated reactions and objections to his arguments. He defended his 
arguments with vigor but was open-minded and intrigued by others' assessments. 
In particular, Larry objected to "the fiduciary confusion," that the range of situations in 
which fiduciary duties might apply to one or more actors, as well as the criteria-which Larry 
saw as too indefinite-that govern the application duty. 1 Larry argued that '"the 
fiduciary confusion" reached its depth in partnerships and other unincorporated business 
l. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 211. 
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to resolve the confusion, he recast the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a consequence of a 
"contractual delegation of broad power over one's property."2 Turning to agency law, my 
concern in this Essay, Larry wrote that the principal's power of control, essential to a 
relationship of common-law agency, "may be inconsistent with the kind of open-ended 
delegation that creates a fiduciary relationship" as he defined it. 3 In contrast, my starting point is 
that an actor who is not subject to fiduciary duties is not an agent. That is, the fiduciary 
character of agency is (and should be) a constitutive element of an agency relationship, as is the 
principal's power of contro1.4 Despite our disagreements, I always found Larry's scholarship to 
be exemplary for the clarity and robustness with which he articulated and defended underlying 
theoretical claims and thought of him with affection when I drafted this Essay. 
As this disagreement suggests, the definition of agency that grounds the doctrinal specifics 
of agency law is neither obvious nor undisputed. Indeed, as the Essay explains more fully, 
2. Id at 212. 
3. Id at 224. 
4. For a recent application of this point, see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(holding that proponents of ballot initiative to amend California's constitution were not agents of 
the people of California for purposes of having standing to defend the amendment's 
constitutionality because "the most basic features of an agency relationship are missing .... " Id 
at 2666. Proponents lacked both a principal with rights or powers of control and "owe[ d] 
nothing "resembling a fiduciary obligation. Id at 2667). Of course, it is not necessary to prove 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship to establish that a relationship is one of agency because 
the agent's fiduciary duties are a consequence ofthe agent's position. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. e (2006); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F. 3d 
1229, 1250 (lOth Cir. 2013). For fuller discussion of the fiduciary character of agency and its 
linkage to the principal's power of control, see Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of 
Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, eds., forthcoming 2014) available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edulfaculty _scholarship/31291 [hereinafter DeMott, Fiduciary 
Character] . 
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whether agency law is itself a coherent subject with substance independent of other bodies of law 
has long been questioned.5 This Essay explores the intellectual history of formulations of agency 
doctrine in the United States, which undertook to respond to fundamental challenges to the 
subject's coherence. The essay argues that this effort may have prompted formulations of 
agency doctrine (in particular in the Restatement (Second) of Agency) that were broadly cast in a 
quest for a consolidating level of generality that threatened to consume long-established doctrine, 
including limits on the scope of a principal's legal responsibility for conduct by the agent. In the 
United States, the successive Restatements of Agency have been the focal points for scholarly 
engagement with the subject since the mid 1920's.6 
5. As the question was stated relatively recently, is agency "only the sum of a variety of 
legally regulated relationships ... [7]", Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY at xi. See also Thomas Krebs, Agency Law for Muggles: Why There Is No Magic in 
Agency, in CONTRACT FORMATION AND PARTIES 205,205 (Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel eds. 
2010) ("there is much to be said for a view ... which maintains that the rights and liabilities of 
the parties must generally be derived from and explained by an application of the general rules of 
contract, tort, and unjust enrichment."). Other recent scholarly accounts note that agency law 
contains rules that are not explicable by other bodies of law. See, e.g., LAURA J. MACGREGOR, 
THE LAW OF AGENCY IN SCOTLAND 32 (2013) (arguing that "[a]lthough one could describe 
agency law as sui generis, it is more accurately described as the application of parts of private 
law to situations involving principal and agent, coupled with rules specific to agency law (for 
example, the undisclosed principal)."}. See also infra text accompanying notes 11-23. 
6. My prior scholarship links the Restatements' centrality to the fact that no competing 
comprehensive account of agency emerged in the United States, in contrast with common-law 
subjects like Contracts and Torts. See Deborah A. DeMott, The First Restatement of Agency: 
'What Was the Agenda?, 32 So. ILL. U. L.J. 17, 18 (2007) [hereinafter DeMott, The First 
Restatement]. The last comprehensive account of the subject published in the United States 
(apart from the Restatements) was FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 
INCLUDING NOT ONLY A DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT BUT ALSO SPECIAL CHAPTERS 
ON ATTORNEYS, AUCTIONEERS, BROKERS AND FACTORS (2d ed. 1914). See also Alfred Conard, 
What's Wrong with Agency?, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 540, 547 (1949) (noting that "there has been no 
treatise attempted since Mechem's second edition of 1914"). Mechem's treatise consists of two 
volumes and runs, exclusive of tables and index, for 2191 pages. For further discussion of 
Mechem's treatise and its influence, see infra text accompanying notes 21-23 & 91. 
INHERENT AGENCY]OWER-ESSAY- FOOTNOTES,DOCX (Do NOT DELETE) 8/19/143:10 PM 
No,N] INHERENT AGENCY POWER 105 
More broadly, the Essay argues that agency relationships, as the law uses these terms, are 
best understood to enable one person (a "principal") through an independent actor (the "agent") 
to take legally-salient actions in relationship to third persons and facts about the world.7 An 
agent, that is, functions as the principal's representative, as an extension of the principal, while 
retaining the agent's own separate legal personality. Unlike some fiduciaries, an agent as such 
does not function as the principal's substitute; as a consequence, the principal's continued 
existence is requisite to any ongoing agency relationship.8, Viewing agency through the 
metaphor of extension helps to rationalize well-settled doctrine; it also furnishes an analytic 
criterion against which to evaluate doctrinal formulations that delimit the extent of a principal's 
liability to third parties. In agency law, these limits become especially salient when an agent has 
7. Formally defined, "[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 
'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the 
principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). To the same 
substantive effect is the counterpart definition in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 
(1958). In contrast, in the first Restatement, "fiduciary" is not present in the definition, see 
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 1 (1933). A subsequent provision, contained within a topic 
delineating "Essential Characteristics of Relationship," characterizes an agent's relationship to 
the principal as fiduciary. Id. § 13 (stating that "[a]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters 
within the scope of his agency."). Comment b observes that "the understanding that one is to act 
primarily for the benefit of another is often the determinative feature in distinguishing the agency 
relationship from others." Id. at cmt. b. 
8. See DeMott, Fiduciary Character, supra note 4, at 3. Thus, a typology of fiduciary 
relationships should distinguish ones of extension from ones of substitution. Relationships in 
which an actor renders advice to another are do not necessarily fall into either category but may 
be characterized as fiduciary, especially when the adviser obtains confidential information from 
the advisee, holds itself out as a disinterested source of investment or financial advice, or seeks 
separate remuneration for furnishing advice. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource 
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1399, 1461-63 (2002). 
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acted contrary to the principal's instructions or beyond the bounds of authorized action as 
prescribed by the principal, or the principal so claims after the fact of the agent's action. 
To test the metaphor of extension, the Essay focuses a well-known formulation present in 
Restatement (Second) but jettisoned by Restatement (Third): inherent agency power (or 
powers).9 The Essay argues that inherent agency power misconceived the point of Agency as a 
distinct subject through an understandable but ill-fated attempt to frame doctrine in broad and 
generalized terms. 10 The history explored in the Essay illustrates the origins and arguable 
motivations underlying inherent agency power. Section II begins with an introduction to 
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §8A (1958). 
10. The other leading example of such a misconception is the prospect-created by 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)( d) (1958)-of a principal's vicarious liability for 
an agent's torts on the sole basis that the agency relationship aided in the commission of the tort. 
Restatement (Third) rejects this theory. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 n.2 
(2013) (noting Restatement Third's rejection of "aided-in-accomplishing" theory for vicarious 
liability). Vicarious liability as stated by Restatement (Third) requires either that the agent, if an 
employee, have acted within the scope of employment; or that the agent have acted with apparent 
authority in dealing or communicating with a third party on or purportedly on the principal's 
behalf, or that the agent's apparent authority have enabled concealment of the tort. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (2006) (stating circumstances under which principal is 
subject to vicarious liability); id. § 7.07 (stating principal's vicarious liability for torts committed 
by employees within the scope of employment); id. § 7.08 (stating principal's vicarious liability 
when agent acted with apparent authority in committing tort or concealing it). 
Venturing beyond the scope of this Essay, it may be justifiable for a court to impose vicarious 
liability when an agency relationship enables the commission of a tort against a victim who 
could not have reasonably believed that the agent acted with authority, as when the principal 
confers power on the agent over important elements of the life of a vulnerable victim. See 
Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183, 1199-1200 (2009)(recognizing theory 
of vicarious liability against employers when employee "has by reason of his employment 
substantial power or authority to control important elements" of the livelihood or life of a 
vulnerable person). "Aided-in-the-accomplishment," when coupled with a mitigating structure, 
also has an established presence in employment-discrimination litigation. Vance, 133 S.Ct. at 
2441--43 (discussing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 755 (1998». 
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agency's controverted status and uncertain contours when the American Law Institute undertook 
to restate the common law. The account draws on unpublished archival material associated with 
this early history to illustrate the intellectual and practical stakes as the participants then 
understood them. Section III explores the history-a complex one-of the doctrine of inherent 
agency power, a category articulated in Restatement (Second) that provided for the principal's 
liability when the agent acted with neither actual nor apparent authority and that furnished a 
rationale for liability operative across a broad swath of disparate cases. This history illustrates, 
among other things, the lingering consequences that stemmed from an early and narrow 
definition of apparent authority. Section IV examines the practical and theoretical implications 
of inherent agency power. A concluding section ties the history and its consequences back to the 
fundamental challenges to Agency as a distinct subject and back to the importance of clarity in 
how one defines an agency relationship and the point of agency law. 
II. Agency's Controverted Status and Contours 
Whether the common law of agency should be characterized as a distinct or independent 
subject, and, if so, whether it has sufficient internal coherence to be a "proper title in the law,"!! 
have been prominent questions for over a century. To be sure, beginning early in the nineteenth 
century, scholars published lengthy descriptive books compiling and organizing precedents that 
primarily focused on contractual disputes between agents and their principals, and principals and 
the third parties with whom their agents dealt.!2 However, to answer a question Oliver Wendell 
11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REv. 345,345 (1891). 
12. The first book-length treatment of agency was published by an English barrister in 1811, 
followed by an American edition in 1822. See WILLIAM PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
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Holmes raised with his students at Harvard Law School in 1882,13 agency's status as a "proper 
title in the law" required that it be distinct from other bodies of law already recognized as 
"proper titles_" Floyd Mechem, who wrote the last comprehensive American treatise on agency, 
acknowledged "[t]hat there are some unique cases-like the rules respecting the undisclosed 
principal, for example-cannot be denied; though some have preferred to treat these merely as 
anomalies rather than as the subject of a distinct system of rules." 14 
Against this backdrop, work on the first Restatement of Agency began with a question 
mark. Commissioned by the Council of the American Law Institute to prepare a report on 
"Classification of the Law," Roscoe Pound came to Agency at the end of his report, situating it 
PRlNCIPAL AND AGENT, CHIEFLY WITH REFERENCE TO MERCANTILE TRANSACTIONS (2d Am. ed. 
1822). The first indigenous American work was JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
AGENCY AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE (1839). For discussion 
of other early works, see I MECHEM, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
13. His brief tenure on the Harvard Law faculty began in February 1882; when the 1881-1882 
academic year opened, the school had 139 students and four full-time professors. Appointing 
Holmes to a fifth professorship required raising an endowment, which was funded by William F. 
Weld, Jr. at the urging of Louis Brandeis. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 198-201 (1993). Upon his appointment, Holmes began 
preparing for the courses he was to teach in fall 1882: Torts, Agency and Carriers, Suretyship 
and Mortgages (full-year courses, each one hour per week with the exception of two hours for 
Torts); and Jurisprudence and Admiralty (one-semester, one-hour courses). Id. at 201-02. 
Holmes resigned in December 1882 to accept appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts.ld. at 202. He accepted the judgeship without consulting either his colleagues on 
the law faculty or Charles W. Eliot, the President of Harvard University. Id. at 202-03. The 
suddenness of his departure startled his faculty colleagues, but perhaps not President Eliot, who 
had earlier written to Holmes that he '''remain[ ed] free to accept a better position or more 
congenial environment elsewhere,'" unless Holmes to returned to law practice within five years, 
which would be acceptable '''only in the improbable case that you had not succeeded as a teacher 
oflaw. ", Id. at 199. President Eliot was aware that Holmes had been seeking a judgeship. Id. at 
198. 
14. I MECHEM, supra note 6, at 4. 
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within a series of "Specific Questions ofClassification."15 To Pound's question, "The place of 
Agency?," his report gave no answer. 16 Another sort of question mark lingered as well. Holmes 
had established agency's substantive distinctiveness but had also challenged the subject's 
intellectual cogency and merit. Perhaps because his teaching duties included agency law, 
Holmes identified many instances in which the presence of an agency relationship led to 
distinctive results. 17 But distinctiveness and intellectual strength are not identical; a catalog of 
anomalous results would be a collection of miscellany, not an intellectually systematized "proper 
title." Holmes claimed that agency-law doctrine rested on no more than an identification 
between principal and agent traceable to the Roman law applicable to slaves, plus common 
sense. 18 The fact that the fictitious identification of agent and principal led to distinctive results 
could be explained by "the survival in practice of rules which lost their true meaning when the 
objects of them ceased to be slaves."19 
A separate but related question for Agency, if designated a "proper title," was its content 
and, in particular, whether the Restatement, like the agency treatises, should mostly focus on 
15. See Roscoe Pound, Preliminary Report to the Council on the Classification of the Law, 2 
A.L.I. PROC. 379-425, at 423 (1924). 
16. Portions of Pound's system of classification-but excluding his question about Agency-
were published as Roscoe Pound, A Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1924). 
17. See Holmes, supra note 11, at 368-71. 
18. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 16,228-32 (1963). 
19. Id. at 232. 
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contractual questions or should additionally fully address the legal consequences-for all three 
parties-of an agent's tortious conduct that injures a third party. And were employees 
("servants" in the older nomenclature )20 relevant actors for an Agency Restatement? In the 
preface to the second edition of his treatise, Floyd Mechem wrote in 1914 that 
[i]t seems desirable to point out,-what perhaps sufficiently appears from the text itself,-that 
although the title Agency in modem times is quite frequently made to include the relation of 
Master and Servant as well as that of Principal and Agent, this book is primarily designed to deal 
with the latter subject, and the former subject is dealt with only incidentally and for the purpose 
of rounding out the discussion of the latter.21 
Indeed, the treatise continues, "[t]he proper discussion of the law of Master and Servant, in all of 
its bearings, would require volumes."22 Consistent with this view, of the 2191 pages in the 
substantive body of Mechem's treatise, only 127 focus on the principal's liability when an agent 
engages in tortious conduct. 23 
When work began in 1923 on the first Restatement of Agency, Professor Mechem served 
as the Reporter. He was acknowledged by the ALI's governing body, its Council, as the "one 
20. Restatement (Third) of Agency jettisons the master-servant terminology. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. a (2006). 
21. I MECHEM, supra note 6, at iii-iv. 
22. Id at iv. That such length would be requisite might have been due to Mechem's writing 
style, which was not concise, plus his preference for a highly articulated scheme of organization. 
23. II MECHEM, supra note 6, at 1436-1563. Mechem's treatise demonstrates a sustained 
commitment to an "exhaustive" "enumeration of possibilities," which he acknowledged the torts-
related material did not achieve. Id at 1436. 
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person preeminently fitted"24 for that role, charged with research and drafting, and assisted by a 
group of expert advisers. It appears that Mechem and his advisers addressed provisions dealing 
with the implications of employees' torts in 1928. At a meeting among Mechem and his 
advisers, plus Francis Bohlen (the reporter for contemporaneous work on the Restatement of 
Torts), all agreed to "treat[ment] in extenso in this re-statement as a particular application of 
principles which would be more generally stated in the re-statement on Torts."25 Discussion at 
the meeting appears to have focused, not on a draft written by Mechem-perhaps unsurprising 
given his treatise's relative reticence about "the relation of Master and Servant"26-but on a text 
prepared by Warren A. Seavey, one of Mechem's advisers: "[t]he group for the purpose of 
discussing the question went hastily over Mr. Seavey's typewritten suggestions, section by 
section, to see whether or not it would be advisable to expand the Topic27 for Agency 
purposes. "28 
24. American Law Institute, Report of the Executive Committee of the Council on 
Organization, Work and Budget Adopted May 5, Considered by the Council May 19, 1 A.L.I. 
PROC., Part III app. 2 at 97-98 (1923). 
25. American Law Institute, Minutes of Meetings of Conferences of Reporters and Advisers, 
Apr. 28, 1928, at 1 (hereinafter Advisers' Minutes). In its early days, the ALI took minutes of 
advisers' meetings, which were transcribed via carbon paper onto onion-skin paper and 
distributed to individual participants. Although these minutes were not published, I reviewed a 
set from the agency meetings that belonged to Judge John Kimberly Beach, who became an 
Adviser to the project in 1927. Thus the record available to me did not include minutes of 
meetings held prior to May 1927. In 1940, Judge Beach's estate presented his set of minutes to 
the Yale Law Library. I am grateful for the Yale Law Library's loan of this material. 
26. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
27. Advisers' Minutes, Apr. 28, 1928, at 1. It is not entirely clear what "the Topic" was at this 
point. At the next meeting "Topic VI" covered "Defaults of Principal or Master in Connection 
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How best to draft the Restatement's text to accommodate doctrine related to torts was also 
on the agenda. Professor Mechem stated that he agreed it was desirable "to try to include ... an 
idea that has been suggested here which I did not include, that is to say, a more general statement 
of the ground of liability of the principal or master for the act of his agent or servant, quite 
regardless of the question whether it is within the ordinary rules of respondeat superior."29 
Seavey-but Mechem was reluctant-proposed a division along the lines of "[l]iability ofa 
master for the Torts of his servant; then the liability of a master for Torts of agents who are not 
servants,"30 which corresponds to the structure in the published version of the first Restatement 
of Agency.3! But the underlying question of whether to attempt a broader formulation to 
rationalize or amalgamate the torts-related doctrines with doctrine stemming from mercantile 
disputes remained. 
Seven months later, on December 11, 1928, Floyd Mechem died.32 Warren Seavey 
succeeded him as Reporter,33 taking on, as he characterized it, "an almost impossible situation, 
with the Agency." "Topic VII" was headed "Liability for Torts." Advisers' Minutes, Aug. 1, 
1928, at 2. 
28. Advisers' Minutes, Apr. 28, 1928 at 1. 
29. Id. at 1-2. 
30. Id. at 2-3. 
31. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY, ch. 7, topic 2, title B ("Torts of Servants") & title 
C ("Torts of Agents Who Are Not Servants") (1933). 
32. Mechem was sixty-five years old when he began as Reporter and intermittently suffered 
from health problems. See DeMott, The First Restatement, supra note 6, at 20. 
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and all that we can say about it is that we are doing the best we can."34 Referring to the draft 
presented to the ALI's members at the ALI's 1929 Annual Meeting, Professor Seavey continued: 
"[y]ou will find possibly some inconsistencies due to the fact that the method of approach is 
mine, but based on what Mr. Mechem had done before."35 Seavey carried the project through to 
its final publication in 1933. By the time he succeeded Mechem as Reporter, Seavey had been 
designated Mechem's special adviser.36 
Although Professor Seavey did not follow Mechem in the treatise-writing tradition, he 
attained visibility as a scholar of agency law with a law review article published in 1920.37 In 
that article, Seavey took aim at Holmes, arguing in effect that Holmes had drifted into 
intellectual nihilism: were Holmes correct, "we are ... denied by our beliefthe ability to 
33. Seavey, born in 1880, lived a long and robust life. For illustrative details, see WARREN A. 
SEAVEY & DONALD B. KING, A HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PROFESSOR: WARREN A. SEAVEY'S LIFE 
AND THE WORLD OF LEGAL EDUCATION (2005). Seavey's posthumously-published memoir 
expresses his gratitude to Mechem for asking him to prepare a second (1925) edition of 
Mechem's casebook on agency and, "[m]ore importantly, he asked me to be one of his advisors" 
for the Restatement. Id. at 54. At that time a professor at the University of Nebraska's law 
school, Seavey also served as the dean and de facto as university counsel. Id. at 53-54. He left 
Lincoln for the University of Pennsylvania, joining the Harvard Law faculty one year later. Id. 
at 58-59; 65. 
34. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Tentative Draft No.4, 7 A.L.r. PROC. 233 (1928-
1929). 
35. Id. at 234. 
36. Seavey was formally designated Mechem's Assistant in 1927. DeMott, The First 
Restatement, supra note 6, at 23. 
37. SEAVEY & KING, supra note 33, at 51. While teaching summer school in Bloomington, 
Indiana, Seavey later wrote that he "had a little cubbyhole over the kitchen in which I spent the 
evenings thinking and writing about Agency." Id. at 51. The resulting article, although rej ected 
by the Harvard Law Review, "was the basis of my invitation to work for the American Law 
Institute" after it was published by the Yale Law Journal. Id. 
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rationalize the subject and relying only upon intuition to determine when and to what extent 
common sense is to be applied."38 Instead, wrote Professor Seavey, "Justice Holmes 
overestimates the effect of the fictions .... the results reached by the courts can be explained 
without using legal presumptions as axioms and ... individual cases may be tested by the use of 
judicial sense (rather than common sense) and the needs of commerce."39 Professor Seavey's 
bold optimism in 1920 about Agency as a subject for rationalized treatment-as fully a "proper 
title in the law"-no doubt shaped his approach as Professor Mechem's successor and then as the 
sole Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 
Additionally, and unlike Mechem, Seavey was not reticent about the place of torts within 
Agency doctrine. After all, he was celebrated as a torts professor4° and as "one of a dynasty of 
torts men," in William Prosser's assessment.41 Some of Professor Seavey's own scholarship on 
38. Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L. J. 859, 859 (1920). 
39. Id. 
40. This is probably an understatement; Seavey taught not just Torts but Agency (then a 
required first-year course at Harvard Law School). Many of Seavey's students assessed him as 
"the best of their teachers, bar none." John M. Maguire, Warren Abner Seavey, Bussey Professor 
of Law , 5 HARV. L. SCH. BULL. No.6, at 3 (Dec. 1954). Professor Maguire credited Seavey with 
"giv[ing] first-year classes their proper obstacle race, forcing them to learn the difference 
between rabbit chasing and the real fox hunt." Id. 
41. William A. Prosser, Warren Seavey, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1338, 1338 (1966). Referring to a 
law professor as "a [Subject Matter] man" may have been conventional usage in that era. Seavey 
himself characterized Arthur L. Corbin as "a Contracts man" in discussions at an ALI annual 
meeting. See Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Agency Draft, 31 A.L.I Proc. 202 (1954). 
Referring to a letter received from Professor Corbin (who was not present), Seavey said, "[h]e is 
a very nice fellow but he is a Contracts man, and you know how stubborn Contracts men are." 
Id. Corbin wrote to express disagreement with the treatment of general agents in Restatement 
(Second) § 161, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 48-49. 
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tort law-distinct from his work on the first Restatement of Torts-may reflect the depth of his 
engagement with the absolute character of a principal's liability associated with agency law. 
That is, if a principal is subject to vicarious liability for torts committed by an agent, it is 
irrelevant whether the principal might be said to be at fault, as (for example) negligence-based 
tort liability requires. And, of course, whether a principal becomes a party to a contract made by 
an agent is likewise not a fault-driven inquiry. Writing in 1934, Professor Seavey predicted that 
the future development of tort doctrine was toward greater imposition of strict (or "absolute") 
liability that was not fault-based: "while ... conduct which is morally bad will become 
increasingly penalized, the absence of negligence or fault in other cases will playa continually 
smaller part .... "42 Although developments in tort law as of2013 have not borne out this 
prediction,43 Seavey's embrace of automatic liability helps explain subsequent developments in 
the narrative. 
III. From the "Third Bottle" to Inherent Agency Power 
A. The "third bottle" and its contents 
Even prior to Floyd Mechem's death, participants in the Restatement project identified 
instances in which a court had held a principal liable for an agent's conduct albeit in the absence 
of any of the bases for liability identified by Professor Mechem's typology, when an agent acted 
42. Warren A. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior", HARV. L. ESSAYS 433 
(1934), reprinted in WARREN A. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 129, 159 (1949) (hereinafter 
Seavey, Respondeat Superior). 
43. See, e.g, James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
377 (2002) (arguing that negligence has and will continue to dominate tort law instead of strict 
liability) . 
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in disregard of the principal's instructions or limits imposed by the principal on actions for which 
the agent had authority. They used a catch-phrase, "the third bottle," which contained examples 
of liability not captured by Mechem's definitions of actual or apparent authority and in which 
conventional principles of estoppel also seemed inapplicable.44 Seavey pressed Mechem to 
acknowledge that "the third bottle" with its contents warranted formal recognition as a distinct 
basis for liability.45 Mechem resisted, and the disagreement remained unresolved when he died. 
Reflecting years later in his memoir, Professor Seavey wrote that 
Mr. Mechem, who knew all the cases as no one else did, could not accept my interpretation of a 
group of cases which I had thought of as adding a distinctive agency liability to the principal, all 
cases in which an agent has disobeyed orders. In the fall of 1928, I stubbornly refused to agree 
with Mr. Mechem, who believed that my views interfered with the principal's rights. When he 
left [the advisers' meeting] for Chicago he was worried, since before that, while we had 
disagreed at times on phraseology, we had not disagreed on substance. The dispute was of 
course ended by Mr. Mechem's unfortunate death.46 
But Mechem's death did not, in fact, resolve the substance oftheir disagreement, as later events 
reveal. 
44. The "third bottle" appears to have been settled usage within the group by 1927. One 
might imagine that the metaphorical first and second bottles contained instances of liability 
based on actual and apparent authority. Why bottles as the chosen containers I leave to the 
reader's imagination. 
45. Consider an exchange between Professors Mechem and Seavey involving cases that, 
applying New York law, find the principal liable when an agent authorized to issue a bill of 
lading did so contrary to the principal's instructions. Mechem asked Seavey: "If we adopt the 
New York view do you regard that liability as a third bottle liability or do you think it can be 
worked out as a matter of apparent authority[?]" Advisers' Minutes, Oct. 19, 1928, at 32. 
Seavey replied: "I do not think that in many of the cases dealing with bills of lading there is any 
apparent authority, among other reasons being these, that the subsequent bona fide taker knows 
nothing of the personality or even the particular agent who in fact misused his authority in 
signing the bill oflading." Id. at 32-33. 
46. SEAVEY & KING, supra note 33, at 65-66. The last advisers' meeting preceding 
Mechem's death was held in New Haven on Oct. 19-21, 1928. 
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What specific instances of liability did "the third bottle" contain, apart from the common 
feature that the agent disobeyed orders? One candidate, on which Professors Mechem and 
Seavey disagreed, was a so-called general agent who disregarded an instruction narrowing the 
scope of actual authority.47 Often Professor Mechem and his advisers discussed hypotheticals 
based on reported cases and reacted seriatim, as in a meeting in August 1928: 
A is a general agent for the management ofP's grocery business, except in the one particular. 
His principal has told him: 'You must not buy any sugar.' A goes to T who does not know 
previously of the business and represents that he is authorized to buy sugar for P. 
Question: Is P liable to T?48 
Mechem answered "No," and Seavey "Yes;" two advisers agreed with Seavey, while the ALI's 
Director (William Draper Lewis) was "not prepared to make any answer."49 
4 7. The first Restatement, like Restatement (Second), differentiated between general and 
special agents. A general agent "is an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions 
involving a continuity of service." RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 3(1) (1933); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3(1) (1958). In contrast, a special agent "is an agent authorized to 
conduct a single transactions or a series of transactions not involving continuity of service." 
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 3(2); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3(2). This formal 
distinction is not repeated in Restatement (Third), which acknowledges that many cases use this 
terminology but also states that "[t]he labels matter less than the underlying circumstances that 
warrant their application." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01, cmt. d (2006). 
Restatement (Third)'s resolution is consistent with the reactions of some of the advisers to the 
first Restatement, one of whom observed that "it seems to me that the difference between a 
special and a general agent is important only in an evidential way, that is, evidential of the 
position which the agent holds." Advisers' Minutes, Oct. 21, 1928, at 39 (statement of Frederick 
Green). Another commented that "I also have some doubt as to whether the distinction between 
the general and special agent furnishes any real line of cleavage." Id. at 40 (statement of Judge 
John K. Beach). 
48. Advisers' Minutes, Aug. 5,1928, at 32. 
49. Id. 
INHERENT AGENCY]OWER-ESSAY- FOOTNOTES.DOCX (Do NOT DELETE) 8/19/143:10 PM 
118 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 201x 
Another candidate for the third bottle was an agent for an undisclosed principal, situated to 
manage the principal's business in the agent's name, who contravened a narrowing instruction. 
The specific focus for analysis was: 
P directs A to carryon business for him, P, under A's own name. The business thus managed for 
P by A is the retail grocery business. P directs A under no condition to purchase sugar for P's 
business, the direction amounting to a limitation of authority. A carries on the business in his 
own name as directed and purchases from T, on credit in the name of A, sugar for the business. 
A does not pay [T]. Is P liable to T for the purchase price?50 
Professor Mechem did not venture a reply. All the advisers (and Director Lewis) agreed that P 
should be liable to T. However, their reasoning differed: two advisers emphasized that, by so 
situating A, P represented to third parties who might deal with him that A owned the business51 
or that P "manifested to the world" that A had the powers of an owner, including the power to do 
all things necessary and usual in managing the business. 52 Professor Seavey, with whom two 
other advisers agreed, emphasized settled authority supporting liability,53 but also claimed that 
this instance of an undisclosed principal's liability lent support for a larger "underlying theory 
that the one who controls, as well as benefits by the business, should pay for the to be expected 
consequences of his engaging in the business."54 Other examples of the "underlying theory" at 
50. Id. at 37. 
51. Id. (statement of Judge Beach) at 37. 
52. Id. (statement of Judge Marvin B. Rosenberry) at 38-39. 
53. The best-known of a small number of cases is Watteau v. Fenwick, [1893] EWHC (QB), 1 
Q.B. 346 (Eng.). 
54. Advisers' Minutes, Aug. 5, 1928, at 40-41. 
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work were "[t]he cases of master and servant" as well as "those in which a principal has 
entrusted an agent with goods limiting the disposition ofthe goods."55 What's intriguing from 
the vantage point of 20 14 is not so much that the first Restatement (consistently with most cases) 
resolved these two hypotheticals in favor of imposing liability on the principaP6 but the breadth 
and generality of the rationale that, in Professor Seavey's view (in 1928), justified the imposition 
of liability. The rationale's formal appearance awaited the Restatement (Second) proj ect. 57 
B. Enter Inherent Agency Power and "The Son of the Great Mechem" 
The contents of "the third bottle" found a name at the ALI's 1956 Annual Meeting in the 
course of Professor Seavey's presentation of a draft portion of Restatement (Second). He stated 
that what the draft termed "Derivitive58 Agency Power" had been discovered and formalized 
"about in 1930 ... that there were situations in which a principal would be liable to a third 
person, although the agent who acted for him had no apparent authority and there was no 
55. Id. at 40. 
56. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 161 (1933) (unauthorized acts of general agent when 
third party "reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and has no notice that the 
agent is not so authorized"); id. § 195 (acts of manager appearing to be owner; principal subject 
to liability to third persons with whom agent "enters into transactions usual in such businesses 
and on the principal's account"). To the same effect are the black-letter counterparts in 
Restatement (Second) but, as discussed infra in text accompanying note 68, the comments claim 
both for the turf of inherent agency power. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 & § 195 
(1958). 
57. Reflecting later on his success, Professor Seavey wrote that "although I had difficulty in 
getting the council and the membership of the Institute to agree with me, they finally acquiesced 
.... " SEAVEY & KING, supra note 33, at 66. 
58. The text of the tentative draft under discussion spells the word "Derivitive, but the table of 
contents and cover page spell the word conventionally, as "derivative." See Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, Tentative Draft No.4 ix, l3 (1956). 
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estoppel."59 "But, astonished by our discovery, we never thought of giving this power a name 
until recently" when another [unnamed] member of the Agency group proposed assigning a 
name to "this strange thing .... "60 Searching for a better name, participants at the Annual 
Meeting proposed alternatives, including "relational power,"61 "relationship power,"62 "agency 
power,"63 and "anomalous agency power,"64 until finally an ALI member proposed "inherent 
agency power."65 Professor Seavey agreed, and no one voted in opposition to the term.66 As 
published in 1958, the Restatement (Second) included a formal black-letter definition of inherent 
agency power, as "a term used in the restatement of this subject to indicate the power of an agent 
which is derived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency 
relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other 
59. Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of Tentative Draft No.4, Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
33 A.L.1. PROC. 314-15 (1956). As discussed above, the case for a "third bottle" with disparate 
contents appears to have been made as early as 1928, at least by Seavey. See supra text 
accompanying notes 44--45. 
60. Seavey, supra note 59, at 315. 
61. Id. at 316. 
62. Id. at 317. 
63. Id. at 318. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 322. 
66. Id. at 322-23. At the 1955 Annual Meeting, Seavey referred to "a special agency power .. 
. . a power which exists when there is no authority and no apparent authority." Warren A. 
Seavey, 32 A.L.1. PROC. 179 (1955). 
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agent."67 Commenis io other sections stated the applicability of inherent agency power to 
(unsurprisingly) a principal's liability when a general manager oversteps a privately-imposed 
limit on the authority typical of such a manager,68 an undisclosed principal's liability when its 
agent appears to own the principal's business, and a master's liability for torts committed by 
servants.69 
This turn in doctrinal statement encountered a notable critic at the 1956 Annual Meeting: 
the author of the suggested term "anomalous agency power," Professor Philip Mechem.7o To 
Philip Mechem's suggestion of "anomalous agency power," Seavey responded, "I know, because 
you do not like it.71 Professor Seavey introduced Philip Mechem to the 1954 Annual Meeting as 
"the son of, shall we say, the Great Meacham [sic]."72 Philip Mechem, then a law professor at 
the University of Pennsylvania, was a scholar ofthe law of property and decedents' estates who 
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1958). 
68. Id § 161, cmts. a, b. Comment a characterizes the principal's liability as "comparable to 
the liability of a master for the torts of his servant." Id cmt. a. 
69. Id §. 195 cmt. b. Comment a characterizes section 195 as a special instance of section 
194, which imposes liability on an undisclosed principal for usual or necessary acts done by an 
agent authorized to conduct transactions for the undisclosed principal. Id § 194. Comment a 
situates this liability within the ambit of inherent agency power. Id § 194 cmt. a. 
70. 33 A.L.I. PROC. 318. The meeting transcript misstates Professor Mechem's first name and 
middle initial and misspells his last name. See id at 8. 
71. Id at 318. 
72. Warren A. Seavey, Tentative Draft No.2 of Restatement (Second) of Agency, 31 A.L.I. 
PROC. 201 (1954). 
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taught several private-law subjects at Penn and other law schools.?3 His scholarship on agency 
law included the third edition of his father's casebook,74 as well as law review articles;75 he also 
served as an adviser to the Restatement (Second) project.?6 When he retired from teaching, a 
colleague characterized Philip Mechem as a man with an "ingrained and wholesome distrust of 
generalities, of the major premise that seldom provides a solution for the concrete case."77 Philip 
Mechem's skepticism encompassed legal realism,78 and, based on his comments at ALI annual 
73. George L. Haskins, Philip Mechem, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1036 (1963). 
74. FLOYD R. MECHEM, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (Floyd R. Mechem, ed., 3d 
ed.1942). Seavey was responsible for the second edition. See supra note 33. 
75. See Philip Mechem, The Rationale of Ratification, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 649 (1952); Philip 
Mechem, What's Wrong with Agency?-A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 203 (1949). 
76. By this time, it appears that the ALI no longer prepared and distributed minutes taken at 
advisers' meetings, as it did for the first Restatement. See supra note 25. Thus no written 
resource enables me further to plumb the dynamics of the relationship between Warren Seavey 
and Philip Mechem. Still, one might wonder whether Seavey thought listeners at the 1954 
Annual Meeting might infer that Philip was "the lesser" to "the Great" Mechem. See supra text 
accompanying note 72. Philip Mechem, born in 1892, was twelve years younger than Seavey; 
his teaching career began in 1922. Haskins, supra note 73, at 1036. Prior to joining Penn's 
faculty in 1948, Philip Mechem was a professor at the University of Iowa College of law for 18 
years, interrupted by two years in Washington with the Department of Justice. Mason Ladd, 
Philip Mechem, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1038 (1963). 
77. Haskins, supra note 73, at 1036. 
78. Philip Mechem, The Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IOWA L. REv. 669, 669 (1936). His 
methodology as a scholar could include functional analysis but, in a well-received article on 
gifts, the functional analysis was accompanied by "nearly one hundred pages of analysis to 
specific types of gift transfers, and to the operation of the rules of delivery regarding each one." 
Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of Consideration, 101 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1876, 1935 (2001), commenting on Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in 
Gifts of Chattels and ofChoses inAction Evidenced by Commercial Instruments (pts. 1-3),21 
ILL. L. REv. 341,457,568 (1926). 
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meetings, several doctrinal turns in Restatement (Second) that departed from the first 
Restatement.79 And, at the 1956 Annual Meeting Philip Mechem forecast that the term "inherent 
agency power" would confuse law students. 80 
IV. Implications 
Inherent agency power thus emerged as a broadly-cast rationale for a disparate set of 
cases, in which, for the most part, courts had reached predictable and justifiable results. As a 
doctrinal statement, however, the now-formalized and generalized essence of "the third bottle" 
In contrast, Warren Seavey, to be sure never associated with the legal realists, may have been 
somewhat bemused by the movement. In an essay published in 1934, Seavey wrote that 
"[s]everal years ago the class in Torts at [Harvard Law School] was studying ... [a case in 
which] the railroad company was held responsible because one of its servants assisted an 
inebriate passenger from the train and left him half way up a flight of steps down which, 
according to the jury, the servant should have anticipated that his charge would fall. One of the 
realists in the class, endeavoring to ascertain whether the decision had affected the conduct of the 
railway, entered a train of the same company and purported to be drunk. He was carefully 
ejected, led to the station, and there held in safety until placed in the custody of a policeman." 
Seavey, Respondeat Superior, supra note 42, at 148 n. 36 (citation omitted). 
79. At the 1954 Annual Meeting, Philip Mechem spoke at length, questioning the introduction 
of "subservants" as a distinct category of subagency. 31 A.L.I. PROC. 215-218. At the 1956 
Annual Meeting, discussing section 219, see supra note 10, Philip Mechem said, "[t]here has 
been some exaggeration here on the part ofthe learned Reporter." 33 A.L.I. PROC. 373. He 
argued that the basis for the principal's liability in section 219(2)( d) should explicitly be limited 
to instances in which an agent acts with apparent authority in committing a tort. Id. at 374-75. 
80. "I have been teaching that for fifteen years now, and just calling it agency power. My 
students all understand perfectly. Why confuse them by adding these erroneous adjectives?" Id. 
at 318 (statement of Philip Mechem). 
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potentially had broad implications, especially in transactional settings. Leave aside for a 
moment agents who represent undisclosed principals, that is agents who deal with third parties 
who lack notice they deal with anyone's agent. 81 As expressed in general doctrinal form, 
inherent agency power implied that a disclosed principal might be subject to liability when the 
agent acted without actual authority and the third party with whom the agent dealt had notice of 
the agent's lack of authority. If so, in what sense could the agent be characterized as the 
principal's representative or extension in the transaction? The agent acted without actual 
authority, that is, without a reasonable belief that the principal so wished the agent to act.82 And, 
if the third party had notice that the agent acted without authority, the third party could not 
reasonably believe that the agent acted with authority, and no manifestation made by the 
principal, whether specifically to that third party or more generally, could underlie a reasonable 
belief that the principal had authorized the agent so to act.83 Exceptionally, one court in 2000 
found a principal liable on a contract on the basis of inherent agency power on facts in which it 
was acknowledged that the third party was aware that the agent-the president of a 
corporation-lacked authority because in prior dealings with the same third party, specific 
authorization from the corporation's board of directors had been required for comparable 
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(2)(b) (2006) (defining "undisclosed 
principal"). 
82. Id. § 2.01 (defining "actual authority"). 
83. See id. § 2.03 (defining "apparent authority"). 
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transactions.84 Additionally, the principal had taken no steps to augment the president's 
authority, and the third party lacked notice of any. 85 The application of inherent agency power 
on such facts meant that the principal bore ongoing responsibility to remind the parties with 
whom its president might deal that prior restrictions on his authority remained in effect. 
It may come as no surprise that the Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006) jettisoned 
inherent agency power, both as a doctrine and as an overarching rationale.86 As a doctrine, 
inherent agency power always risked an outcome like that just described, in which a third party 
succeeded in holding a principal to a transaction despite demonstrable notice that the agent 
lacked authority so to commit the principal. Doctrinally, Restatement (Third) deals more 
narrowly with well-established instances of liability when an agent disregards or disobeys 
instructions from the principal. For example, an undisclosed principal may not rely on 
84. Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1208 (Ind. 2000). For a pointed 
critique of Menard, see John Dwight Ingram, Inherent Agency Powers: A Mistaken Concept 
Which Should Be Discarded, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 583,591-93 (2004). 
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03, reporter's note (arguing that outcome 
reached in Menard "appears to outrun" Restatement (Second)' s formulations of inherent agency 
power). 
86. For scholarly treatments of inherent agency power, see Gregory Scott Crespi, The 
Proposed Abolition of Inherent Agency Power by the Restatement (Third) of Agency: An 
Incomplete Solution, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 337 (2005); Ingram, supra note 84; Steven A. 
Fishman, Inherent Agency Power-Should Enterprise Liability Apply to Agents' Unauthorized 
Contracts?, 19 RUTGERS L.1. 1 (1987); Roger J. Goebel, The Authority of the President Over 
Corporate Litigation: A Study in Inherent Agency, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 29 (1962); J. A.C. 
Hetherington, Trends in Enterprise Liability: Law and the Unauthorized Agent, 19 STAN. L. REv. 
76 (1966); Edward A. Mearns, Jr., Vicarious Liability for Agency Contracts, 48 VA. L. REv. 50 
(1962); Warren A. Seavey, Agency Powers, 1 OKLA. L. REv. 3 (1948); Kornelia Dormire, 
Comment, Inherent Agency Power: A Modest Proposalfor the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 5 
1. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 243 (2001); Matthew P. Ward, Note, A Restatement or a 
Redefinition: Elimination of Inherent Agency in the Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of 
Agency, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1585 (2002). 
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instructions to its agent that reduce the agent's authority to less than that a third party would 
reasonably expect the agent to have in the same circumstances had the principal been disclosed. 87 
This formulation would result in liability for the hypothetical undisclosed principal discussed by 
the advisers to the first Restatement in 1928 who had prohibited the purchase of sugar by the 
manager of a retail grocery store;88 the rationale stresses protecting the reasonable expectations 
of third parties who deal with an agent in the belief the agent owns the business or otherwise acts 
on the agent's own behalf, a belief stemming from the set-up created by the undisclosed 
principal. 89 On a more theoretical level, as a rationale that linked a number of distinctive 
instances of liability, inherent agency power had the major drawback that it did not state a 
normative principle. As Gerard McMeel explained, inherent agency power is a component of an 
"ontological" account of agency law, not a normative account. 90 That is, inherent agency power 
itself did not furnish reasons that justified the imposition of liability, and its very generality 
placed it at too great a remove from the normative principles operative in the diverse cases linked 
by inherent agency power. 
A pragmatic (and historical) explanation for the appeal of inherent agency power is the 
narrow definition of apparent authority operative throughout work on the first and second 
Restatements. This narrowness had multiple dimensions. Floyd Mechem's treatise did not 
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.06(2). 
88. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.06 cmt. c. 
90. Gerard McMeel, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Agency, 116 L.Q. REv. 387, 
396-99 (2000). 
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acknowledge the possibility that apparent authority and actual authority may coincide; unless a 
principal's creation of the appearance of authority supported an inference of "real" authority in 
Professor Mechem's terminology, the third party's sole resort was to the principle of estoppel, 
which would require the third party to show reliance.91 But as work proceeded following 
Professor Mechem's death, Seavey and his team realized that Mechem's approach required that 
the principal have made divergent manifestations: to the agent (creating actual authority) and to 
the third party (creating apparent authority). This formulation did not work when, as often 
happens, an agent continued to appear to act with authority after the principal revoked it or 
reduced its scope, all unbeknownst to the third party with whom the agent then dealt. 92 To 
accommodate the well-known phenomenon of post-revocation "lingering authority," the final 
draft recognized that actual and apparent authority may co-exist. 93 
More generally, given the opacity of actual authority to a third party-based as it is on 
manifestations and understandings as between principal and agent-apparent authority viewed 
more functionally often reinforces actual authority when the means of proving actual authority 
are inaccessible to a third party.94 Even when a principal furnishes an agent with a written 
statement of the extent of the agent's authority that the agent may display to third parties, the 
91. I MECHEM, supra note 6, at 509-12. 
92. See DeMott, The First Restatement, supra note 6, at 27-28. 
93. Id. at 28. 
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03, cmt. c. Across legal systems, apparent 
authority, broadly defined, is a significant basis for liability in contemporary agency law. See 
Danny Busch & Laura J. Macgregor, Comparative Conclusions, in THE UNAUTHORISED AGENT 
439,440 (Danny Busch & Laura J. Macgregor eds. 2009). 
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document itself is not (in Mechem's terminology) "real" authority but, instead, salient to 
showing its existence and to establishing the agent's apparent authority.95 Although the written 
statement would not necessarily coincide with other directives from principal to agent that 
expand or narrow the agent's actual authority, it may be reasonable for a third party to proceed 
on the basis of the written statement when nothing calls the existence or extent of the agent's 
authority into question. 96 
Additionally, neither the first nor the second Restatement contained a formal definition of 
"manifestation," whoever its maker or audience might be. At the ALI's 1956 Annual Meeting, 
Professor Seavey resisted recasting apparent authority so that its creation would follow from 
placing an agent in a position in which the agent might reasonably appear to have authority.97 As 
a consequence, a principal's "manifestation" to third parties would not encompass the act of 
placing an agent in a position with which authority of a particular scope is conventionally 
associated.98 In contrast, Restatement (Third) contains a formal (and broad) definition of 
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmt. d (2006). 
96. Id. 
97. 33 A.L.I. PROC. 381 (1956). 
98. Additionally, Professor Seavey over-estimated the explanatory power of contract law, in 
particular in connection with apparent authority. He stated at the 1955 Annual Meeting that 
"[ a ]pparent authority ... is based upon the contract theory that wherever P has manifested to T 
that A is the agent, he is making an offer to T in accordance with his manifestation. And when 
the agent acts, the agent makes a valid contract with T .... " Friday Afternoon Session-May 20, 
195532 A.L.I. PROC. 174, 179 (1955). This account does not capture a well-known set of cases 
in which an agent's appearance of authority enables the agent to defraud a third party, thereby 
subjecting the principal to, among other possibilities, tort liability, even though the principal did 
not authorize the commission of fraud. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 261-62 
(1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08. 
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"manifestation"99 that encompasses placing an agent in a position that is customarily associated 
with authority of a particular scope. 100 Thus, on the facts of the first hypothetical discussed by 
the advisers in 1928-a disclosed principal imposes an undisclosed restriction ("buy no sugar") 
on the general manager of a grocery_IOI Restatement (Third) need not resort to inherent agency 
power to specify the circumstances under which the principal would be liable for the agent's 
purchase of sugar contrary to a limiting instruction received from the principal, unbeknownst to 
all other than principal and agent. 102 
A scholar in the future might view Restatement (Third) as a reflection of its times, in 
which the parties to many agency relationships are organizations with agents whose actual and 
apparent authority is wrought into and expressed by the positions they occupy, and many 
disputes governed by agency doctrine involve business entities, themselves constituted through 
internal chains of agency relationships. In contrast, the earlier Restatements appear implicitly to 
assume that most agents, principals, and third parties are individuals and thus to ground doctrine 
in an assumed prototype that does not realistically correspond to the complex world in which 
many people live and work. Moreover, even assuming an individual person to be the 
paradigmatic legal subject for purposes of common law agency, the earlier Restatements made 
authorial choices that evoke an earlier era, one with a pre-industrial flavor and in which all actors 
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.03. 
100. Id cmt. b. 
101. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
102. See also Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. State Office ofIns., 309 P.3d 372,380-81 (Wash. 2013) 
(reaching same outcome under second and third Restatements when general agent does unlawful 
act that was then customary in industry). 
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identified by gender are men. 103 Throughout, transactions involving horses form the bases for 
many Illustrations. I04 Moreover, and likely more jarring to a contemporary reader, many 
Illustrations in the Torts material feature chauffeurs as agents. I05 The assumed social world in 
103. In contrast, in its 2005 official style handbook, the ALI articulated its expectation that 
Reporters would "strive to eliminate all traces of sexism from the language they draft on its 
behalf." See AM. L. INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A 
HANDBOOK FOR ALI REpORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 29 (2005). "Sexism" is 
reflected in "language that, often unconsciously, betrays stereotypical assumptions about the 
gender of those occupying particular social roles." Id. By 2005, "what has been referred to as 
'generic man and its compounds' ... is no longer acceptable in ALI drafting." Id. at 30 (quoting 
MARILYN SCHWARTZ ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR BIAS-FREE WRITING (1995). Thus, ALI Reporters 
"must aim for gender-neutrality in their writing." AM. L. INST., supra, at 30. 
104. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4 cmt. f, illus. 6 (1958) ("A offers to sell 
a horse to T, and in reply to T's question concerning the identity of the owner for whom he is 
acting, A states that he is unable to give his name. The principal is partially disclosed."); id. 
illus. 7 ("In contracting for the purchase of a horse, A tells T that he is acting for John Smith, a 
horse dealer in a neighboring city. There are two John Smiths who are horse dealers in that city. 
Of these, T knows only one, and erroneously, but reasonably, he believes that A is referring to 
the dealer who is not A's principal. There is no contract between T and A's principal."); id. § 
106 cmt. c, illus. 9 ("P authorizes A to buy a horse. A knows that P desires to buy only one 
horse and he also knows that P has not authorized any other agent to buy one. Before A has 
bought a horse, P buys one. A has no notice of this. A's authority does not terminate."); id. § 
194 cmt. b ("[I]f a general buying agent for a menagerie, directed to buy no more horses, were to 
buy one for himself, and by a separate contract, one for his employer, the principal would not be 
liable for the former. He would, however, be liable for the one purchased for the menagerie."). 
105. See id. § 213 cmt. h, illus. 10 ("P employs A as his chauffeur. Thereafter, A periodically 
gets drunk, as P, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know. While using P's car on P's 
business, A gets drunk and runs into T with the car. P may be liable to T, aside from his liability 
as master."); id. § 220 cmt. k, illus. 5 ("P employs A to drive him around town in A's automobile 
at $4.00 per hour. The inference is that A is not P's servant. IfP supplies the automobile, the 
inference is that A is P's servant for whose conduct within the scope of employment P is 
responsible."); id. § 226 cmt. b, illus. 4 ("P and B set up a bachelor apartment and employ a 
chauffeur, A, it being understood that A is to receive halfhis wages from each of them, and is at 
all times to obey the orders of either of them. A, while driving negligently in a borrowed 
automobile to deliver P's suit to the tailor, injures T. A is the servant ofP and ofB at the 
time."); id. § 229 cmt. d, illus. 11 ("P employs A as a chauffeur, requesting him to drive the car 
to A's own garage for the night at the termination of the day's work, in order that A can arrive 
early in the morning. In driving to and from the garage to P's place of business, A is within the 
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some Illustrations is reminiscent of the world depicted in the literary works ofP.G. Woodehouse 
and occasionally Agatha Christie. 106 As a consequence, although the earlier Restatements 
articulated the doctrine of a "proper title in the law," they did so in a manner that may have 
enabled agency law to be overshadowed in accounts of the essential underpinnings of business 
enterprises. 107 
V. Conclusion 
At the ALI's 1956 annual meeting, a member of the ALI's council (Charles H. Willard) 
commented that perhaps the draft's discussion of inherent agency power, by emphasizing the 
scope of employment."); id. § 231 cmt. a, illus. 1 ("A, P's chauffeur, to avoid a rough spot in the 
road while upon an errand for P, unlawfully drives upon the sidewalk. This conduct is within the 
scope of employment."); id. § 235 cmt. a, illus. 1 ("T proves that P directed his chauffeur, A, to 
drive to the station to get a package for P, that A immediately drove in the direction of the station 
by the customary route and that, while so driving, he negligently ran into T. There is now an 
inference that A was driving in the scope of employment. P can rebut the inference by proving 
that A was driving solely for a purpose of his own and not to get the packages."); id. cmt. d, illus. 
6 ("A, while driving as chauffeur for P, negligently throws his lighted cigarette from the window 
ofthe car into a passing load of hay, not intending to ignite it but careless as to where the 
cigarette falls. P is not liable for this act."). 
106. See, e.g., id. § 221 cmt. b, illus. 3 ("A, a thief, falsely purporting to have been employed 
for P by B, an agent ofP, serves P as a butler, intending to use the employment only as an 
opportunity for theft. So far as he renders the ordinary services of a butler, A is P's servant. In 
the act of serving poison in the coffee to occupants of the house in order that he can subsequently 
rob them, he is not acting as a servant."). 
107. For a theoretical account of the nature of business firms that is explicitly centered on the 
law, including agency law, see ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE 
FIRM (2013). Professor Orts argues that "[f]irms of any complexity beyond a single individual 
cannot exist without the law of agency." Id. at 54. Early in the book, he notes that his project "is 
radical, though not in the sense of 'new.' It is radical in the etymological sense of returning to 
conceptual roots that have been overlooked and often forgotten." Id. at xviii. Professor Orts 
argues that "an overgrowth of economic theory has hidden some of these legal roots," including 
agency law. Id. But the texts that established agency's status as a "proper title" may have 
facilitated its later obscurity. 
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"true" agency power that inherent agency power represented, necessarily implied that a great 
deal of the remainder of the subject was not agency law at all, but "really branches of the law of 
contracts, ofthe law of torts, and other fields of the law."108 Professor Seavey responded that he 
did not intend such a reading, but Mr. Willard rejoined, "I submit that 'agency' stands more on 
its own feet, which I am sure you believe in."109 By referring to any power associated with 
"agency," Mr. Willard continued, "one think[s] of the entire range of power, apparent authority 
as well as this anomalous kind ofpower."110 Thus, the terminology of inherent or 
"anomalous"lll agency power was unnecessary .112 
Standing "on its own feet," in Mr. Willard's terms, agency counted as a "proper title in the law." 
Implicitly, Mr. Willard replied to the challenge to the intellectual merit of Agency articulated by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and others. 113 He also implicitly made the point that a "proper title in 
108. 33 A.L.I PROC. 319. 
109. Id at 320. 
110. Id 
111. To Philip Mechem, the author of this term, see supra text accompanying notes 64 & 70-
71, the draft's treatment of inherent agency power was "a novelty, an unnecessary novelty." 33 
A.L.I. PROC. 320. He reported that he was "dumbfounded, to find ... that apparently the whole 
law of master's liability is now treated as an agency power." Id 
112. Id at 321. 
113. Mr. Willard, who served on the ALI's Council for 38 years, was acknowledged as "a 
walking compendium of banking law"; he served as a partner of Davis, Polk and Wardwell from 
1950 to 1973. See Joseph F. Johnston, Charles Hastings Willard, in ALI MINUTES IN 
REMEMBRANCE 1976-1997 81, 82 (1998). Although Mr. Willard's comments at the ALI's 1956 
annual meeting refer to teaching, see 33 A.L.I. PROC. 321, and he taught as a visiting lecturer as 
Yale Law School following his retirement from Davis Polk, a colleague on the A.L.I.'s Council 
notes that his contributions as an adviser to Restatement projects were especially valued by 
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the law" might rely on more than one nonnative principle to justify liability but nonetheless 
possess overall coherence and intellectual strength. Inherent agency power represented an 
attempt to elide the differences between, on the one hand, the justifications for an employer's 
liability for torts committed by employees acting within the scope of employment, 114 and, on the 
other hand, the justifications for holding a principal to a contract to which an agent committed 
the principaL Inherent agency power also patched over the far-reaching consequences of an 
unduly crabbed treatment of apparent authority. But agency's stature as a subject is not 
undennined by acknowledging its multiply-footed nature. 1 15 From th~ perspective of2014, 
perhaps inherent agency power represented an interim response, shaped by many constraints, to 
Justice Holmes's challenge. Recognizing more generally that agency relationships enable the 
legally-salient extension of a principal's personality through an agent's representation underlies 
and enables a more robust response. 
Reporters because Willard "provided a valuable practicing lawyer's perspective in groups 
heavily weighted in favor of judges and academics." Johnston, supra, at 81. 
114. Restatement (Third) acknowledges the respondeat superior principle-an employer's 
liability for torts committed by employees within the scope of their employment-as a distinct 
principle of attribution within agency law, along with actual and apparent authority. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
115. To be sure, agency law is not the sole "proper title in the law" that serves multiple 
objectives and has attracted more than one account of its underlying purposes or rationale. See, 
e.g., L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1,46 
YALE L. J. 52, 53-54 (1936) (identifying three distinctive purposes that the award of damages for 
breach of contract may pursue and arguing that the law of contract damages is not separable 
"from the larger body of motives and policies which constitutes the general law of contracts."); 
Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective 
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1801, 1824 ( 1997) (arguing that deterrence and corrective justice are 
"equal or concurrent rationales" for basic doctrines of tort liability, including negligence and 
strict liability). 
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